Throughout the last decades, corruption and related practices have enjoyed much attention from social scientists. The common notion is that these problems constitute severe obstacles to political and economic development in large parts of the world. However, scholars interested in corruption have traditionally not shown much interested in countries found to be the world´s least corrupt in Transparency International's Corruption Perception index and similar measures. This paper argues that this bias tend to obscure the problems and risks of corruption and abuse of power also in 'least corrupt' settings. Just because such problems are relatively smaller in these countries compared to those found at the bottom does not however imply they are immune against such problems, and it does not mean that corruption cannot have real and damaging effects in countries receiving high ratings by experts. In this paper we analyse public perceptions of corruption and their effects in Iceland -a particularly interesting case when it comes to questions concerning corruption. According to CPI, it was the least corrupt country in the world in 2005 and 2006. However, after the financial collapse in 2008, it plummeted in the CPI. However, survey data show that substantial shares of the public perceived political corruption as widespread even before the crisis, only to skyrocket in the aftermath of the financial crash. Drawing on survey data, we show that public perceptions of corruption exercised a strong and significant effect on political support, both before and after the crisis. However, after the crisis the effects of perceived corruption became much more pronounced, even to the extent that perceived corruption strongly affects support for the democratic regime. We argue that our findings have implications for how we ought to approach the question of corruption even in so called 'least corrupt' settings, and they also cast doubt on the validity and reliability of comparative subjective expert measures such as the CPI.
Introduction
In May 2008, just a few months before the financial collapse in Iceland, one could read the following lines in The Guardian (2008-05-18 Despite what has happened in Iceland since the financial breakdown, it is fair to say that in the mid 00's -considered as an ideal type -Iceland comes close to what could be regarded as Utopia: if we look at a few variables deemed to be crucial for welfare, back then, it was the most developed country in the world. Against this backdrop, and then considering the deep financial crisis that followed the golden years in the early 00's -a crisis which some observers believe to have been caused by clientelism and other forms of behaviour related to corruption (Kristinsson 2012; Vaim et al. 2011 ) -we believe that the Icelandic experiences are worth investigating if one wants to learn more about the effects of corruption.
Thus, in this paper the Icelandic case will be used in order to answer three overarching questions connected to more general issues related to public perceptions of corruption and political support. The first question concerns public perceptions of corruption in a country where corruption traditionally has been perceived to be close to absent by different comparative indices, such as the CPI. Do ordinary citizens, despite top rankings in the CPI, perceive corruption as a real existing problem and other indices based on the perceptions of experts (e.g. Iceland before the financial crash in 2008)? The second question is also descriptive in kind, and deals with how the crisis affected public perceptions of the extent of corruption and political support in general. Thirdly, we set out to investigate if the claim of earlier research -mostly focusing on new democracies and developing countries -arguing that public perceptions of corruption have a strong impact on general system support receives support also in the case of Iceland. Here, we have the opportunity to empirically examine the relationship between perceptions of corruption and political support in two interesting contexts: first before the crisis, when Iceland was widely regarded as practically non-corrupt, and then after the crash, when different aspects of corruption and public malpractice were revealed and brought up to public debate. Thus, we also have the opportunity to investigate if the effects of perceptions of corruption on political support are magnified in times of crisis, and in the end negatively affect the legitimacy of the political system. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly introduce the Icelandic case.
Thereafter, in the third section, we introduce our theoretical framework, define and operationalize the independent and dependent variables, and discuss what we should expect to find in our empirical material. We then go on to describe our data and present a few notes on our methodological approach. In the fifth section, we present data on political support and public perceptions of corruption, as measured before and after the crisis. In the sixth section, our empirical analyses are carried out and the results are presented. The seventh and concluding section sums up our main arguments and results, and we discuss the implications of our findings.
The context: Iceland and the financial crisis of 2008
Let us start out by giving context to our case -i.e. the country we have chosen, and the economic crisis on Iceland, which plays an important role for our analysis. Iceland is a small island country with about 320,000 inhabitants, located in the middle of the North Atlantic, almost exactly between the European and American continent. Throughout the twentieth century up until the 70s and 80s, it could fairly be described as a comparatively poor and underdeveloped country, with an economy heavily relying on fishery and agriculture.
However, from the mid-1980s and onward, the economy developed rapidly. In the late 1990s it was one of the wealthiest nations in the world, and come mid-00s, fishery and agriculture no longer carried the economy. Instead, since the privatisation of the banking sector -which was completed in 2000 -Iceland had quickly become a hotspot for financial services and investment banking.
However, the economic boom came to an abrupt end in October 2008 when the three largest banks -accounting for around 85 per cent of the country's banking system -collapsed.
Iceland underwent the deepest -and quickest -economic crisis ever recorded in after the Second World War (cf. Eythórsson et al 2011) . This led to a massive increase in state debt, devaluation of the Icelandic Króna, and rampant unemployment. Riots in front of the Parliament followed and the ruling political coalition came to an end (cf Eythórsson & Kowalcyk 2013).
In 2009, the parliament launched an independent Special Investigation Commission with a mandate to investigate the causes of the collapse. The commission's report was presented in April 2010 (which is worth bearing in mind in the light of the data we analyse, that were collected in 2009). As shown by Eythórsson et al (2011) , the report blames the government, the Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority for negligence, and it hints at possible legal implications for the politicians and public officials that are named in the report.
Without doubt, the commission exposed severe flaws in the Icelandic public administration, which -the report maintains -weakened the country's infrastructure and had an important role in the economic collapse.
In this context, it is important to note that several commentators have highlighted that corruption (or practices that resemble corruption) -and, remember, in a country that was (2011) argue that it was a symbiosis of business and politics that allowed for self-serving and unethical decisions made by the Icelandic business and political elite. Furthermore, Kristinsson (2012) maintains that clientelism and doubtful political appointments could well have had an important role in generating the crisis, since they made the public administration weak and ineffective in carrying out its duties.
The fact that corrupt practices may be an underlying structural cause of the financial crisis is, we argue, important to bear in mind when we analyse the effects of corruption perceptions on Iceland. In addition to this, the experienced corruption investigator Eva Joly, who was assigned to investigate corruption allegations in the Icelandic banking system, has argued that the potential corruption in Iceland should be treated as one of the most important financial investigations Europe has ever known. She has also publicly criticised what she perceives as a lack of political will among Icelandic politicians to bring those who have committed economic crimes to justice (The Telegraph, 2009-06-11) .
Theoretical framework
In this section, we define and operationalize the central concepts employed in the empirical sections below. The core concepts are political support (the dependent variable) and perceptions of corruption (the main independent variable). We then discuss how these variables are expected to be related to one another, i.e. why it is plausible to argue that public perceptions of corruption constitute an important determinant of political support, and in particular, why this ought to be the case in Iceland.
The dependent variable: political support
Political legitimacy is no doubt important. However, the concept is widely debated and lacks a universally accepted definition. This is hardly surprising considering that, as Gilley (2006a: 499) puts it, 'the concept of political legitimacy is central to virtually all of political science because it pertains to how power may be used in ways that citizens consciously accept'.
In comparative politics two different understandings of legitimacy can be singled out. Wheatherford (1992) argues that the earliest understanding of legitimacy consisted of 'the view from above', resting on the assumption that an outside observer, relying on aggregate evidence of regime actions and performance, could measure the legitimacy of a political system. Wheatherford (1992: 150) The strength of this view is its broad theoretical view and that it formulates legitimacy in terms of systemic properties that enhance the possibilities of comparative analysis. The main weakness lies in its focus on formal structures and aggregate processes. One particular shortcoming is the insufficient recognition of the need to observe the 'subjective' micro-level aspects of the political system, i.e. the perceptions and attitudes of the general public. Take for example the attribute of procedural fairness, which is central to the purposes of the present study: is it at all possible for an outside observer to 'objectively' assess levels of procedural fairness in different countries? It is doubtful. Rather, we believe that in order to empirically measure a concept like procedural fairness we need micro-level data that tap into ordinary people's perceptions of the procedural fairness of the political system they live in.
Along with the growth of publicly available public opinion data, this perspective has, to a large extent, been replaced by what Wheatherford calls 'the view from the grass roots'. This perspective is particularly concerned with citizen evaluations of the legitimacy of their political system. Thus, it is more consistent with the mainstream theoretical basis of legitimacy since all definitions of the concept ultimately rely on public perceptions of the political system (Booth & Seligson 2009: 8; cf. Gilley 2009; Rothstein 2009; Easton 1975) .
Most empirical research within this field takes as its departure the pioneering work of David Easton (1965; 1975) , who places legitimacy within the framework of 'political support' (Booth & Seligson 2009: 8) . Easton defines legitimacy as the conviction 'that it is right and proper … to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime' (1975: 541). Easton's conceptualization of political support is built on the idea that nationstates can be regarded as political systems, and his framework draws a crucial distinction between specific (oriented towards the performance of political authorities responsible for making and implementing political decisions) and diffuse (more abstract feelings towards the political community and the regime as such) levels of support.
In more recent theorizing on political support, Easton's framework has been refined and expanded. In two influential contributions, Pippa Norris (1999; 2011) has elaborated a framework that treats political support as a multidimensional phenomenon ranging on a continuum from the most diffuse level of the political community to the most specific level of political actors:
1. the political community (feelings towards the nation-state) 2. regime principles (the underlying values of the political system) 3. regime performance (the functioning of the system in practice) 4. regime institutions (actual government institutions), and 5. political actors (actual incumbent officeholders) (Norris 1999; 2011) .
Empirical analyses of different surveys have convincingly demonstrated the fact that the theoretical dimensions are indeed reflected in the minds of citizens (Norris 2011; Booth & Seligson 2009; Klingemann 1999) . In this paper, we explicitly investigate the two 'intermediate' levels of political support: democratic regime principles and regime performance. According to this framework the former is diffuse in kind, and thus more stable and should not be immediately affected by dramatic political events. The latter, being a more specific type of support should however be more sensitive to short-term evaluations of the actual performance of the political system. We could thus expect to see a pronounced effect of the economic crash on support for regime performance, and more modest changes in support for regime principles (if any).
The independent variable: public perceptions of corruption
As indicated previously, parts of the debate in aftermath of the financial crisis in Iceland has been about different aspects of corruption and clientelism. Our theoretical and empirical focus will therefore be directed towards the relationship between public perceptions of corruption and political support. Despite the large stock of research on different aspects of political support, not much is known about the importance of public perceptions of corruption and other aspects related to procedural fairness for people's evaluations of the principles and performance of the political system. This is particularly the case in countries perceived as practically non-corrupt welfare states, such as Iceland (and the other Nordic countries, cf.
Erlingsson et al. 2012; Linde & Erlingsson 2012).
Ever since Weber theorized on the ideal-type modern state, it has been recognised that the delivery of public services ought to be decided in an impartial manner. Thus, fairness has become a central concept in theories and empirical analyses dealing with the behaviour of public administration (Galbreath & Rose 2008; Tyler 2006) . To be considered fair, the institutions of the political system must treat individuals impartially in the allocation of goods and services. This view has been further advanced by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) who argue that impartiality in the exercise of public power actually constitutes the essence of quality of government (QoG). Hence, QoG -understood as impartiality in the implementation of public power -rules out all forms of corruption and particularistic practices such as clientelism, patronage and discrimination (Rothstein & Teorell 2008: 171) . In fact, most research on different aspects of quality of government share the notion that corruption constitutes one of the -if not the -greatest obstacles to quality of government (cf. Rothstein & Holmberg 2012) .
Simply put, corruption breaches the main foundation of quality of government, the impartial exercise of public power.
Corruption and political support in times of crisis: what to expect?
Most research on corruption and its political consequences has dealt with macro-level relationships, such as the cross-country correlation between corruption and democracy (cf. However, recent research has shown that people's perceptions of corruption also seem to have strong effects on satisfaction with democracy in established West European democracies, such as Sweden and Spain (Villoria et al. 2012 ). Also, broader comparative studies using both micro-and macro-level data have pointed in a similar direction (Manzetti & Wilson 2007; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Wagner et al. 2009) Why, then, are perceptions of corruption expected to play such an important part in explanations of system support? The most straightforward answer is provided by procedural fairness theory. Scholars working within this framework argue that legitimacy first and foremost is dependent on people's perceptions and evaluations of whether or not the procedures leading to decisions and implementation of public policy are considered to be fair (cf. Tyler et al. 1989; Tyler 2006; Esaiasson 2010) . Thus, beliefs about the fairness of political procedures are considered to be more important for political legitimacy than evaluations of actual outcomes in terms of individual self-interest. Procedural fairness is therefore explicitly subjective in its character (Esaiasson 2010 ).
In the context of our empirical case, this means that for general political support, people's perceptions of the extent of clientelism, nepotism and corruption in public decision-making are supposed to be more important than the actual situation or the international image of Iceland as a clean and non-corrupt society. And in the case of Iceland, we also have the possibility to investigate how public perceptions of corruption and system support are affected when a country perceived to be relatively clean is hit by a dramatic financial crash, in which clientelism, nepotism and corruption have been claimed to be important causes.
If procedural fairness theory has any explanatory power, public perceptions of the extent of corruption should be an important determinant of political support in general, and citizens that believe that corruption exists within the state and the public administration should be less likely to be satisfied with the overall performance of the democratic system. It could also be hypothesized that this effect ought to be magnified in the aftermath of the crisis, with increased media coverage and exposure of suspect acts. Departing from the analytical model of political support and the results of the previous studies in the field, three hypotheses about the Icelandic case can be formulated:
H 1 : Citizens regarding corruption as widespread are less likely to evaluate the working of the political system in positive terms, and this effect should remain strong and significant under control for other theoretically relevant factors.
H 2 : Since the financial crisis contained aspects that allegedly were related to corruption and clientelism, the effect of perceptions of corruption on political support should be even stronger after the crisis, resulting from increased public awareness of the problem.
H 3 : If the analytical framework of specific and diffuse political support is adequate, the effect of the crisis on political support is expected to be substantial on support for regime performance, but weaker on support for regime principles.
Data
The data used here comes from the Icelandic National Election Survey (ICENES). The survey has been conducted by School of Social Sciences at the University of Iceland after each general election since 1983, i.e. eight times. However, we will only use the four most recent waves that have been carried out from 1999 and onwards. This is due to the fact that the variables of interest for us have only been included in those waves.
ICENES is a post-election survey and the data is collected by telephone. Since 1999, the samples have included between 2,300 and 2,600 individuals 18-80 years of age and eligible to vote. They have been drawn from the national population register as simple random samples 
Mapping political support before and after the crisis
The dependent variable: system support Let us start the empirical section by looking at a number of indicators of political support. We begin by investigating the development of public support for regime performance. The ICENES data contains a battery of questions pertaining to different aspects of system support.
However, the majority of these questions concern specific objects of support, i.e. specific political institutions and political actors. The most relevant question for our purposes is the standard question about satisfaction with the way democracy works. The satisfaction with democracy (SWD) question has been included in the ICENES studies since 1999, which makes it possible to investigate levels of satisfaction at four points in time (three before, and one after the crisis). Table 1 At this point it is safe to say that the data confirm the hypothesis that the 2008 financial crisis had a dramatic and deteriorating effect on Icelanders evaluation of the functioning of the democratic political system. This is however not surprising given the large amount of research on this type of more specific type of political support, and the context dependence of the SWD indicator (cf. Easton 1965; 1975; Norris 1999; 2011; Linde & Ekman 2003) . According to the logic behind the multidimensional concept of political support, dramatic events like the Icelandic crisis could very well have strong effects on specific political support, like confidence in the performance of the government, trust in politicians, and evaluations of more general system performance, like citizens' satisfaction with the way the democratic political system works. Within the same analytical framework, more diffuse support for the underlying principles of the political regime should not be affected in the same dramatic way, but is supposed to more persistent and stable over time (cf. Easton 1975; Norris 2011; .
The ICENES surveys of 2003 and 2009 contain one question that is often used to assess public support for the principles of the democratic regime. This item asks the respondents to agree or disagree with the proposition that 'democracy is not without flaws, but it is still the best form of governance available'. This single question is of course not ideal for measuring support for regime principles, but since it explicitly asks about democratic governance, and not an abstract democratic ideal, it suits our purposes well. As shown in Table 2, in 2003 public support for regime principles was extremely high in Iceland. Almost 98 per cent of the respondents in some way agreed that democracy is the best form of governance. ** Table 2 (Table 1) . Thus, it seems safe to argue that the financial crisis had a major effect on system support in Iceland. It is however important to note that the growing public dissatisfaction does not seem to be directed towards the underlying democratic principles of the political system ( Table 2 ). The crisis also seems to have affected the more specific types of support for political institutions, and especially politicians and political parties. For example, the sentiment that Icelandic politicians are prone to engage in corrupt activities had seen a dramatic boost when measured in 2009, compared to more modest -but still relatively highlevels in 2003 (Table 3 ).
In the following we set out to take a closer look at the relationship between the central variables of interest. The main question is to what extent public perceptions can explain political support on the individual level, when also other important factors are taken into account. And, since the financial crisis soon became an event where allegations of corruption was prominent, could it be the case that public perceptions of corruption had become even more important for people's evaluations of the functioning of the political system in 2009 compared to in the mid 00s when Iceland was widely viewed as one of the least corrupt countries in the world?
Perceptions of corruption and system support

Operationalization and measurements
In this section we set out to investigate the determinants of political support in Iceland before and after the financial crisis. Since we are particularly interested in the effect of public perceptions of corruption on political support, the focus will be on the variable measuring the public's evaluation of the extent of corruption among politicians presented above (Table 3 ). In the following analyses, it has been recoded so that 1 represents 'hardly happens at all' and 4 'very widespread'. The impact of perceptions of corruption is tested on the two dimensions of system support discussed above.
First we estimate the effect of perceived corruption on specific political support using 'satisfaction with democracy' as the dependent variable. In the analyses, the variable has been dichotomised so that all respondents stating that they are 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied with the way democracy works have been assigned the value of 1 and those being 'not very' and 'not at all' satisfied have been given the value of 0. We also model the effect of perceived corruption on support for regime principles, using the variable item 'Democracy is not without flaws, but it is still the best form of governance available'. The variable has been recoded to a dichotomy where the response 'strongly agree' has been coded as 1 and all others as 0.
The multivariate logistic regression analyses also include a number of control variables.
First, we control for the impact of socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.
Gender is coded 1 for men and 2 for women. Age is the respondent's age in years. Urban/rural is measured on a scale from 1(rural area or small village) to 4 (city with more than 100,000 inhabitants). Education is coded on a scale from 1 (incomplete primary) to 7 (complete university undergraduate degree). To measure income we use household income quintiles, from lowest (1) 4). 2 This item has been recoded so that the higher the value, the trustworthier the respondent finds politicians to be.
seems safe to assume that the trustworthiness of politicians is of course not assessed in isolation from their policy record and personal performance (Newton 1999, 179) . Thus, this item is rather closely related to our main explanatory variable, i.e. perceptions about corruption among politicians. Considering this, and our theoretical emphasis on the importance of fairness and impartiality, we expect this variable to have a solid impact on system support.
Since interest in political issues has shown to be related to political support and political efficacy, we include respondents' self-reported level of political interest as a control variable. The last control variables are related to different aspects of democratic representation. It has been argued that one of the key solutions to the problem of widespread political discontent could be to improve the institutions of representative democracy because large portions of the electorate feel that their views are not represented by the political elites governing them (Norris 1999b ). According to this perspective, political support is thus contingent on the quality of representation and participation in the democratic process (cf. Aarts & Thomassen 2008) . Widespread public discontent regarding representation contributes to a democratic deficit, which in the long run could lead to a loss of legitimacy (Norris 1997; 2011) . We include three variables connected to political representation. The first item measures party support, indicating whether the respondent supports or does not support any political party or organization. 4 The second item asks the question if it matters who people vote for 5 , and the last item measures to what extent it matters who is in power 6 . More information about the coding of variables and correlations are found in the appendix. Table 4 The regression analysis provides ample support for the claim that perceptions of corruption constitute an important determinant of support for the performance of the democratic political system. It also provides support for the hypothesis that evaluations of the fairness and cleanness of the political system and the political elites became even more important in the wake of the financial collapse.
Perceptions of corruption and satisfaction with democracy
Since logit regression coefficients can be difficult to interpret intuitively, in Figures 1 and 2 we present graphs illustrating the effect of perceived corruption on satisfaction with democracy. Figure performance. However, when it comes to the more diffuse type of support for regime principles, the effects of a shock-like event like the crisis are more difficult to predict. Table 2 showed that the level of public support for democracy as a system of government remained Table 5 presents two regression analyses with support for democratic regime principles as dependent variable. The independent variables are the same as in Table 4 . What we are interested in here is to investigate if performance/output-related factors have gained in salience after the crisis in such a way that they exercise an important impact on regime principles.
Looking at the data for 2003, we can note statistically significant effects from five variables. ** Table 5 about here ** First, women and people residing in urban areas tend to be more convinced about the importance of having a democratic political system. Also, people who are interested in politics and are trusting politicians are more likely to be convinced democrats. When it comes to representation, those who think that the choice of voting alternative makes a difference tend to be more supportive towards democracy. Regarding the two variables that displayed the strongest impact on satisfaction with the way democracy works -perceptions of the extent of corruption and government performance -we find no significant effects on regime principles in 2003.
In 2009, however, perceptions of the extent of political corruption play an important role also when it comes to support for democracy as political system. In fact this variable has the strongest effect of all variables in Table 5 . This indicates that factors related to political output -related to public evaluations of the actual performance of politicians and political institutions -are important also for generating (or eroding) diffuse political support. As expected, respondents with great interest in politics and higher education are more likely to support democracy as a system of government after the financial collapse.
In relation to our hypotheses, the multivariate analyses clearly confirm the first two perceptions of corruption come out as the strongest determinant also for regime principles.
Concluding remarks
In the mid 00:s, Iceland was widely perceived as one of the most successful countries in the world, ranked as number one on comparative indices of development such as the CPI and the HDI. Additionally, according to surveys the political system enjoyed a high level of legitimacy among the citizens. Then, in 2008, the financial system crashed and Iceland experienced an economic crisis that stands out as the most serious crisis in post-war history.
The state debt and unemployment rates skyrocketed, and the government was forced to resign after riots outside the parliament. Investigations of corruption and abuse of markets and power followed suit. In this paper we have argued that these dramatic economic and political events make a good case for an empirical study of the relationship between public perceptions of corruption and political support with the purpose of investigating how such dramatic events affect these two variables.
Drawing on survey data from before and after the crisis, we find -not surprisingly -that the crisis had devastating effects on the way the Icelandic public perceived the performance of the political system in general, and in particular when it comes to viewing political corruption as a real and existing societal problem. What is particularly interesting to note, however, is that even before the crisis -i.e. When it comes to the hypothesized effect of public perceptions of corruption and political support we present some interesting findings. In line with small but growing body of research on public perceptions of corruption in established democracies, we find that the way the public perceives problems of corruption is an important determinant of general political support.
Although evaluation of the performance of the government was the most important determinant before the crisis, views about corruption had a strong and statistically significant independent effect on satisfaction with democracy. After the crash, however, corruption comes out as an extremely strong determinant of political support, both in terms of support for regime performance and regime principles (although less stronger when it comes to the principles dimension). The results thus provides strong evidence of the claim made by research on procedural fairness and quality of government: that when citizens form their beliefs and judgments of the legitimacy of the political system in general, they first and foremost emphasize the fairness and impartiality on behalf of the political authorities. It also provides evidence for the fact that dramatic events such as the crash and the following allegations of official misconduct and corruption may affect citizens' perceptions so strongly that it in the end has an effect on the legitimacy of the democratic political system. Table 5 . The effects of the independent variable (corruption) are calculated when all other variables in the model are held at their mean.
